Pitfalls to the current expansion by Neil A. Stevens
THE economic expansion following the 1973-75 re-
cession has entered into its fourth year.’ Of the five
previous economic expansions dated by the National
Bureau of Economic Research, all but one lasted at
least three years, but only one of these expansions was
sustained beyond the four-year mark. The longer-run
experience of U.S. business fluctuations since the end
of the Civil War indicates that only three of the pre-
vious 25 business expansions lasted 16 quarters or
longer, and each of these was associated with un-
usual circumstances such as war. As the current re-
covery completes its thirteenth quarter of expansion,
this historical perspective brings into question whether





Indicators of business activity show the economy
has continued to expand in recent months. From Feb-
ruary to June, industrial production grew at an 11
percent annual rate, personal income increased at a
14 percent rate, and total employment rose at a 6
percent rate.
These rapid gains, however, followed temporary
losses in economic activity in early 1978, which
largely reflected the effects of the abnormally severe
winter weather and lengthy coal miners’ strike. The
strength of recent economic activity, therefore, is
‘For a comparison of the first three years of the esorrent expan-
sion with other postwar expansions, see Jean Lovati, “A Per-
spective on the Economy: Three Years of Expansion,” this






overstated in recent data since part of the increase
represents a catch-up from the winter months. Most
of this catch-up appears to have been registered in
March and April, while in May and June most eco-
nomic indicators continued to advance, hut at substan-
tially reduced rates from those in the preceding two
months. For example, industrial production registered
a 5.6 percent rate of increase in May and June, down
from an unsustainable 17 percent rate of increase in
March and April.
The growth of the economy over the winter slump
and subsequent rebound pei-iod has been, on balance,
similar to that registered in the preceding year. In the
six-month period ending in June, industrial produc-
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Hon grew at a 6.7 percent annual rate, total employ-
ment advanced at a 4.8 percent rate, and personal
income rose at an 11 percent rate, all of which are
quite similar to, or somewhat above, the gains regis-
tered by the respective measures in the previous year.
-- But Prices Accelerate
The most unfavorable economic development in
recent months has been the sharp increases in prices.
For example, producer prices for all commodities
(formerly wholesale prices) rose at over an 11 per-
cent annual rate in the first six months of 1978, much
faster than the 5.9 percent increase recorded in 1977.
But these recent increases also overstate tile under-
lying inflation rate. Both agricultural and industrial
commodity prices have increased sha,-ply so far this
year, although the acceleration has been most pro-
nounced for agricultural prices. In some respects,
these sham-p increases are not unlike those registered
in the early months of last year. For example. in
the first six months of 1977, prices of farm products
and processed foods and feeds rose at almost a 22
percent annual rate, but then registered a decline in
the summer months and ended the year only 3 per-
cent above a year earlier. Industrial commodity
prices also increased sharply in the first six months
Relse Scol Prices Rolie Scale
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of 1977, registering a 7.6 percent rate of increase,
similar to this year’s experience; over the second half
of 1977, however, these prices advanced at the more
moderate rate of 5.9 percent.
Like last year, unusually bad weather hampered
the production of some fruits and vegetables early this
year. Some moderation in the rate of advance in food
commodity prices can be expected as these supplies
are normalized, but changes in the supply of and
demand for agricultural products have occurred
which are not likely to be quickly reversed, In con-
trast to last year, prospects for the production of
some major crops this season are down, partly based
on Covernment actions to restrict acreages planted.
In addition, demand for U.S . agricultural products
is stronger this year, based in part on unexpected
strength in foreign demand. In addition, some of the
sharpest food price increases have been among meats,
where the supply response is limited by the biological
nature of the production process. Thus, sharp declines
in agricultural commodity prices, such as occurred
last summer, are not as likely this summer.
At the retail level, consumer prices have increased
at about a 10 percent annual rate in the first five
mouths of 1978, compared with an increase of 6.8
Rotie Scale
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percent in all of 1977. Food prices have been one of
the biggest gainers this year, registering an 18.5 per-
cent rate of increase in the first five months of the
year, while consumer items less food rose at about an
8 percent rate. Increases in food prices are expected
to moderate in the second half of the year as the U.S.
Departmtmt of Agriculture expects a rise of 8 to 10
percent in food prices for all M 1978. Such an in-
crease in food prices, however, does suggest that con-
sumer expenditures for food will accelerate from the
rate of increase last year. Thus, to some extent, ex-
penditures in other sectors may be slowed somewhat,




Fluctuations in economic activity have been a per-
sistent feature of our economic system. Theories
abound as to causes and explanations for such fluctu-
ations. Presumably the economy could achieve a fairly
stable growth pattern if it were not buffeted by
shocks which move the economy off its long-run path.
These shocks include such events as unusual weather
patterns, wars, changes in technology, the exercise of
monopoly power, and overall govern-
ment policies, including monetary and
fiscal. If such shocks lead to fluctuations
in economic activity, then an investiga-
tion of some of these forces will provide
some basis for deciding how endangered
the expansion is at this time.
Monetary Policy Actions
Monetary actions, as shown by numer-
ous studies, can have substantial effects
on economic activity.2 One method of
gauging the effects of monetary actions
on the economy is to examine move-
ments in monetary aggregates, such as
the money stock, while another method
is examining interest rate movements.
Monetary Aggregates—Movements in
the rate of inflation have been associ-
2
For example, see Leonall C. Andersen and Jerry L. Jordan,
“Monetary and Fiscal Actions: A Test of Their Relative Im-
portance in Economic Stabilization,” this Reciew (November
1968), pp. 11,24, and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz,
“Money and Business Cycles,” Review of Economies and Sta-
tistics, Supplement (February 1963), pp. 32-64.
ated with movements in the trend growth of the
money stock. In addition, recessions have usually
been preceded by a period of marked decline in the
rate of money growth below the prevailing trend rate
(see accompanying chart).
Money stock (Ml) growth from early 1973 through
the third quarter of 1976 was generally below its
prevailing trend rate. This extended period of below-
trend growth caused the long-run growth of money,
which had been generally advancing for about a
decade, to level off and to show a slight decline. This
downturn in long-run money growth indicated some
downward pressure was being applied to the rate of
inflation.
Subsequently, growth of the money stock acceler-
ated, and from the third quarter of 1976 to the second
quarter of 1978, monetary expansion proceeded at a
7.8 percent rate. More recently, some slowing in the
growth of the money stock occurred in the first quar-
ter of this year, but a sharp resurgence of monetary
growth in the second quarter offset the first quarter’s
slowdown. On balance, growth of Ml from the fourth
quarter of 1977 to the second quarter of 1978 was
recorded at a 7.8 percent annual rate, about the same
as in the previous two quarters. Over the past four
quarters, Ml grew 7.9 percent, faster than the
6.6 percent rate of increase in the previous four
quarters. These recent rates of increase are above the
long-run growth of money of the previous five years
Percent
II
Annual Rates of Change of the Money Stock (M1)
1953 1955 1957 9959 1961 1963 1965 1967 1969 1971 1973 1975 1977
Shedeel eeee eeptee’t, p,eieede tel be-cheese
Li T’—e-qteee,e ead,M theee~
ix Te~aeeer-q’ee’eresle of the’s,.
Select del, pieee,d: 2ed qeteetee
Page 4FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS JULY 1978
and, if sustained, will again cause the trend growth
of Ml to rise.
Interest Rates — Some analysts judge the stance of
monetary policy by examining movements in market
interest rates rather than monetary aggregates. Rising
interest rates, for example, are interpreted as restrict-
ing economic growth, whereas falling or stable in-
terest rates are said to promote faster economic
growth by encouraging investment and consumption
expenditures.
Interest rates among all maturities have risen sub-
stantially in recent months. For example, the Federal
funds rate stood at about 7.6 percent in June, up
from 6.75 percent in March. The four- to six-month
prime commercial paper rate rose from about 6.8 per-
cent in March to approximately 7.63 percent in June,
and the rate charged to prime business customers by
commercial banks rose from the 8 percent rate pre-
vailing in the first four months of the year to 9 per-
cent in late June. Long-term interest rates have aLso
moved up since last fall. Yields on the highest-grade
corporate bonds remained relatively stable at around
8 percent from May through September last year, but
they have trended upward since then, reaching 8.77
percent in June.
Market interest rates are the price which equates the
demand for and supply of credit. Interpreting move-
ments in interest rates with respect to the stance of
monetary policy is complicated by the fact that inter-
est rate movements can reflect the effects of changes
in current monetary actions on the supply of credit
or the lagged effects of past monetary actions on the
demand for credit.
The recent surge in interest rates appears consistent
with the vie~vthat the rising interest rates reflect in-
creasing credit demand rather than a constriction of
the supply of credit. The fact that loan volume has
expanded more rapidly in recent months tends to
indicate that the demand for credit has been shifting
outward, raising both the price of credit and the vol-
ume outstanding. For example, from March to June,
business loans increased at a 24 percent annual rate
and total bank loans advanced at an 18 percent rate,
compared with increases of about 15 percent in the
previous year.
Further evidence that monetary actions have not
acted to restrict the supply of credit is given by the
continued rapid advances in the underlying aggre-
gates such as Federal Reserve credit and the mone-
Monetary Base
and Adlusted Federal Reserve Credit











1973 1974 1915 1976 1977 1978
LLUse,elehe,eeeteerbesse,,,eee,beeb,ek eeeeeees sed se,eeecyheidbylhe
public end ee,me,bee beebe Adieeeteeeete see ,eede lee eec,,,, eeqeiteoeeet
rheege, eed she lest, depesite cee’eg doss,, el beck, Dole see rospeled by
this setS.
L7 f,deeel Re,,,,, oe,dil re,siels el P,d,esI Reset,, lenidings nI securities. I’s’s,
fl’,t, end etchCe’s,’,,. Ad
1
’ee,sed Fede,el Re,,,,, credit is cecepeted byeubteeelieeg
Teeese,y deposit, etc Psdee,l c’s,,,, seeks I,,,, thi, s,ei en. eed cdiee,eie, eh,,e,ie,
lee ,,seec, eeqeieeceeel tell, rh,,g,, ,ed shift, I, the see, ‘yet, ,l d,pe,it, bet,eee
be’S, tubetc diltereet re,,,,s e,euei,,t,e,el celia,, pply. Dale er, ce,pet,d by lIeit Be’S.
Let,,, dote plott,d. Its,,
Selected Interest Rates
Ratio Scale Ratio Scala
Billions of Dollars Billie!? of Dollars
ISO ISO
1970 1971 9972 1973 1974 1975 9976 Id? 1978
Setteee dde pletted. PBL’~Ja,e30,1975 Othe,eJu,,
Page 5FEDERAL RESERVE SANK OF ST. LOUIS JULY 1979
tary base. These aggregates provide the base on
which expansion of money and hank credit occurs.
The monetary base has expanded at about a 9 percent
annual rate in the past two quarters. the same as in
the previous year.
Disintennediation
Given Governmental restrictions on the rates which
financial intermediaries am-c allowed to pay on depos-
its, rising interest rates have presented another po-
tential shock to the economy. When market interest
rates rise above Government regulated interest rate
ceilings on deposits at financial intermediaries, such
as commercial banks and savings and loan associa-
tions, funds are svithdrawn from these financial institu-
tions and placed in other market instruments which
offer a more attractive yield, This rechanneling of
funds, called disintermediation, may favor some bor-
rowers over others.
The rising interest rates over the past year, partic-
ularly the increases in recent months, have brought
market rates into serious competition for funds at
financial intermediaries. The rate of growth of de-
posits at nonbank thrift institutions, for example, has
slowed markedly in recent months, registering an 8
percent 1-ate of increase in the three months ending
in June, compared with almost a 13 percent rate of in-
crease in the previous twelve months. In addition, net
time deposits at all conunercial banks have increased
at an 8 percent rate in the past three months, some-
what below the 9.3 percent rate of increase in the
previous year.
Thus, while evidence exists that financial interme-
diaries are beginning to lose funds to higher-yielding
investment alternatives, there are reasons to believe
that the disruptive effects on the economy may be
minor, Even on previous occasions when disintcrme-
diation occurred, there was little evidence that total
credit flows were affected; rather, the distribution of
credit among sectors was changed, The housing in-
dustry has generally been the most affected sector
of the economy since it is heavily dependent on
credit from the affected financial intermediaries.
Largely because of the previous periods of disin-
termediation, a number of institutional arrangements
have been made to circumvent problems posed by
clisintermediation. A number of Federal or Federally—
sponsored agencies, including the Federal ~Jational
Mortgage Association and Government National
Mortgage Association, help transfer funds from the
open market into the home mortgage market. In
addition, new credit instrnments, such as the mort-
gage-backed security, allow savings and loan associ-
ations to tap cl-edit mai-kets for long—term funds. Also,
savings and loan associations can borrow from Federal
Home Loan Banks which, in turn, draw funds from
the open market by selling bonds. Commercial banks
can obtain funds in the open market by selling CDs.
Recently, thrift institutions, such as commercial banks
and savings and loan associations, have been allo\ved
to offer time deposits of six-month maturity with
yields pegged to Treasury bill rates, and an eight-year
certificate with a yield of 7.75 percent at commercial
banks and 8 percent at savings and loan associations.
Fiscal Policy Actio-ns
Fiscal actions can have short-run effects on total
spending and output. Over longer periods of time,
however, Government spending financed by borrow-
ing tends to displace private spending for goods and
services, and thus has little lasting effect on economic
activity. During this expansion, Government deficits
have been at unprecedented levels for a peacetime
period. The severity of the 1973-75 recession plus
continued, rapid Government spending pushed the
national income accounts budget deficit to $70 bil-
lion for calendar year 1975. With increasing tax reve-
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insurance and other recession-induced expenditures,
the budget deficit declined to about $50 billion in
1977, still at a very high level for this stage of the
expansion.
The high-emnployment budget, a budget measure
adjusted to remove some of the effects on revenues and
expenditures of variations in economic activity, was
in deficit about $25 billion in 1977. The rate of Gov-
ernment spending accelerated sharply in the second
half of 1977, however, so that the high-employment
deficit of about $16 billion in the first half of 1977
increased to $34 billion in the second half of 1977.
Based on the President’s original tax cut proposal
and the March expenditure revisions, the high-em-
ployment budget was estimated to remaiu in deficit
at around $27 billion in both 1978 and 1979. These
estimated deficits, however, have been revised down-
ward somewhat, reflecting the July expenditure re-
visions and the reduction in the President’s tax cut
proposal from $25 to $20 billion. Nevertheless, the
prospect remains for relatively large budget deficits
in 1978 and 1979, making it difficult to interpret the
stance of fiscal policy as highly restrictive.
Other Shocks
Numerous shocks other than those introduced by
monetary and fiscal policies affect economic activity.
For example, as we saw earlier, the unfavorable
weather and prolonged coal mniners’ strike last winter
had \eisihle effects on economic activity in the first
quarter as economic output was reduced to a stand-
still and prices accelerated. Perhaps the greatest long-
mn danger from such events is the uncertainty’ created
about the future course of the economy. Such uncer-
tainty can serve to generate perverse expectations,
which could result, for example, in significant inven-
tory adjustments. Recent legislative acts, such as in-
creased minimum wages, social security taxes, and
farm si,mhsidies, will have adverse effects on economnic
activity. hut such effects are unlikely to he large
enough to threaten the current expansion.
Capacity Constraints — A major shock was intro-
duced into the economy in 1973 and 1974 as a resl,mlt of
the sharp rise in oil prices which caused a rcduetiorm
in potential output of the economy.°While engineer-
ing capacity presumably remained intact, economic
capacity was reduced. This decline, it ise argued, was
tm
Robert H. Rasche and John A. Tatom, “The Effects of the
New Energy Regime on Economic Capacity, Production, and
Prices,” this Review (May 1977), pp. 2-12; and “Encrgy Re-
sources and Potential CNP,” this Review (June 1977), pp.
10-2-4.
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permanent, lowering potential output 4 to 5 percent.
As of the first quarter of this year, actual output was
only about two percent below this measure of eco-
nomic capacity.
Knowledge about the degree of excess resources in
the economy is an important ingredient for the active
pursuit of stabilization policies. As full employment of
resources is reached, the growth of output becomes
dependent on fi,mndamental gro\vth factors such as
changes in technology and growth in the labor force.
Attempts via stabilization policies to stimulate demand
audi production to levels which cannot be sustained
over the long rl.mn will exacerbate inflation and, even-
tually, may lead to corrective actions and a recession.
POLICY CHOICES AND THE OUTLOOK
Even though the expansion is beginning to reach
“old age” by historical standards, the stimulative mon-
etary and fiscal policies in recent quarters, such as
the nearly 8 percent rate of increase of Mi in the
past year, indicate a continued rapid increase of total
spending through the remainder of this year. As a
result, further increases in output and employment
are likely in the second half of 1978, although out-
put growth probably will be below that registered
over the past three years. Since some excess capacity
still exists, however, output growth can advance in
the second half at or somewhat above the long-run
growth rate.
The course of the economy in 1979 and beyond
depends heavily on policy actions and other simocks
which may occur imm the future. An end to the cur-
rent expansion and the development of another re-
cession could develop in a number of ~vays. Barring
unforeseen shocks, such as the sharp rise in oil prices
which occurred in 1973 and 1974. historical experi-
ence indicates that sharp changes in monetary and
fiscal policies, such as a marked slowing in the rate of
monetary growth below the prevailing trend, often
result in shocks to economic activity.
Rapid nmonetary growth over recent qnarters has
apparently led to some upward revisions in inflation
expectations, as noted in revisions of inflation in most
economnic forecasts and as imnplicitlv observed in ris-
ing long-term interest rates. Should monetary growth
be reduced substantially in the second half of 1978 in
order to reverse these inflation expectations, the flu-
mediate effect of this monetary slowing is likely to be
a slowdown in output growth and, depending on the
length and severity’ of the monetary slowdown, a
recession could develop. Reducing inflation expecta-
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tions is a longer-term process, however, entailing an
extended period of slower monetary growth.
Alternatively, monetary growth at the upper end of
current Ml targets of 4 to 6.5 percent would appear
consistent with stabilizing inflation expectations with-
out incurring sizable short-nan costs of reduced out-
put and higher unemployment. On the other hand,
growth of the money stock at rates similar to or even
above the 8 percent increase which has occurred in
the past year would work to boost output and em-
ployment somewhat further. While output growth
could continue strong for a time, a worsening of in-
flation is a notable danger to such a course of action.
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In summation, for the near term continued eco-
nomic expansion is likely, but the policy choices which
avoid temporary losses in output and/or accelerating
inflation are few. The acceleration of monetary
growth in the past several quarters has reduced the
prospects for simultaneously achieving reduced infla-
tion and continuing output growth. For the near term
stabilization of inflation expectations appears to be
the only alternative for avoiding a sizable reduc-
tion in output growth without putting further up-
ward pressures on prices. Eventually, however, if the
rate of inflation is to be reduced, progress toward low-
ering the trend growth of the money stock must be
achieved.
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